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BIANNUAL SURVEY

the merits does not seem inequitable. But, to award summary
judgment on the merits to a defendant without a full examination
and evaluation of the total concept of the burden of proof, at least
on a theoretical basis, seems to be unsound. If the bill of particulars
did request facts, the proof of which struck at the heart of plaintiff's
cause of action, his practical inability under the order of preclusion
to present such proof would be, in effect, granting a defendant
summary judgment. The question still remains: Should a defendant prevail at judgment regardless of his ability, or inability, to
counter a meritorious allegation which plaintiff is procedurally
unable to prove?
ARTICLE

31 -

DlsCLOSURE

CPLR 3101: Disclosure against the state in other than
the Court of Claims.
Under prior law, the state was able to obtain disclosure against
an adversary regardless of where the action was pending, whereas
disclosure was obtainable against the state only in the Court of
29
after asserting
Claims. In State v. Master Plumbers Ass'n,1
for an EBT
notices
served
defendants
action,
state's
defenses to the
and for discovery and inspection of various documents, which
notices the state sought to vacate. The issue was whether the state
was subject to all the disclosure provisions of Article 31. The
court stated that there was no logical reason for not allowing
disclosure against the state to the same extent that it is available
to the state against any other party.
It is surprising, however, that in drawing such a close analogy
between disclosure in the Court of Claims and in other courts, the
court failed to require that, in the latter case, disclosure be obtainable only by court order. This would be appropriate, since CPLR
3102(f) (which treats disclosure in the Court of Claims) requires
such a court order.
Prior to the decision in the instant case, a contrary result
was reached in State v. Boar's Head Provisions Co.,130 which
disallowed disclosure against the state in a court other than the
Court of Claims. The court reasoned that since prior law had
been construed as forbidding such disclosure, and since the CPLR
made no express change in those prior provisions, disclosure should
be disallowed in a supreme court action. The court in the instant
case failed to cite the Boar's Head case-probably because it had
not yet been reported. The preceding illustrates that by no means
129 47 Misc.

1965).

2d 187, 262 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County

18046 Misc. 2d 759, 260 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1965).
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is the, law in this area completely settled. The decision in Master,
hbwever, points the way for further appellate clarification.
CPLR 3101(a): Full pretrial examination of codefendants
inter sese despite absence of cross-claims.
3
Recently, the second department, in Lombardo v. Pecora,' 1
13 2
with respect to
unified the law (atleast in its own department)
the examination of codefendants. The case involved a personal
injury action arising out of a two-car automobile accident. Plaintiff
was a passenger in car 1 ; defendants were the owner of car 1, the
owner of car 2 and the driver of car 2 respectively. Defendant
Pecora (the owner of car 1) sought to examine the two codefendants (the owner and driver of car 2). Special term denied
the request. The second department reversed, overruling a prior
case to the contrary. 33 It stated that the CPLR provision which
of proof' 34
provides for full disclosure without regard to the burden
rendered obsolete the decision in Johansen v. Gray'35 and that the
interest of achieving uniformity of practice within the several
judicial departments also supported its holding. "[F]ull pretrial
examinations of codefendants inter sese should be allowed with
respect to all evidence which is material and necessary, even in the
absence of a cross-claim by the moving codefendant against the
codefendant sought to be examined."'136
It should be noted that this decision has significant impact in
the area of third-party practice. For example, in Ciaffone v. Manhattantown, Inc.,'37 it was held that a third-party (impleaded)
defendant could not examine a defendant other than the one who
impleaded him (third-party plaintiff). In an earlier installment of
the Survey, it was argued that the court had not decided the case
within the spirit of the CPLR, 135 and the instant case would seem
to indicate an overruling of the doctrine of the Ciaffone case.

13123 App. Div. 2d 460, 262 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1965).
132 The first and third departments have already arrived at the result achieved
in the instant case. Henshel v. Held, 17 App. Div. 2d 806, 233 N.Y.S2d
14 (lst Dep't 1962); Frost v. Walsh, 195 Misc. 391, 90 N.Y.S.2d 174
(Sup. Ct. Rensgelaer County), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 1017, 91 N.Y.S.2d 689
(3d 3Dep't 1949).
13 Johansen v. Gray, 279 App. Div. 108, 108 N.Y.S.2d 35 (2d Dep't
1951).
"L

CPLR 3101 (a).

185 Supra note 133.
138 Lombardo v. Pecora, 23 App. Div. 2d 460, 462, 262 N.Y.S2d 201, 202
(2d Dep't 1965).
13 20 App. Div. 2d 641, 246 N.Y.S.2d 298 (2d Dep't 1964) (memorandum
decision).
'I The Biannml Survey of New York Pratice, 38 ST. Jois L. Rm,.
406, 432-33 (1964).

